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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, § 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance 
of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) provides in pertinent part: 
(2) Prohibited acts B—Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and 
intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order or directly from a 
partitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise 
authorized by this subsection. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating 
Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I 
or II (cocaine) . . . is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
iv 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled 
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), 
(ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of 
marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 .5 (1982) provides: 
77- 7 15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may stop 
any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in,, the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
PI ii i Hit i f t R p s p i m d * i l l ,„ 
v 
LEROY RAYMOND JACKSON, 
Defendant/Appellant;. 
Case No. 8 9 054 6-1 A 
Priority No, 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jur;^di^ +ion i- conferred 
i'u(i(rj mil J ., , • ' - ii. C\H;r- A m * 
^ 78-2a-?i2 i-:upp <:JH(J) whereby lefendant - istrict 
cour* criminal action ma. * . • .* S 
judgment anu . .,.: *
 A Lion i.t my * ime :T ner * J 
first degree vapitui feloi; The Honorable Michael 4urphy# 
Judge, Th i r^ Distri< * -1: e ,»f 
tali, presided over the bench trial Appellant LeRoy Raymond 
Jackson, rendering final judgment and convicting Mr. Jack? o 
count • r . substance, one being a 
*i i n degree felony, the other a class B misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT 01 THE ISSUES 
Were the constitutional rights of Appe-llant violated by a 
po1i ce officer who, w11 hout reasonable suspicI» 111 ipr i m• \ 11 i 
IN I i ii i i 1 , , b 11 i i a * x -ess oi . parking lot? 
When did i :;•-» otiricer initiate the encounter with Appellant? 
Were the constitutional rights of Appellant violated when 
the officer, who still possessed no reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, requested Appellant's identification even though he had 
already recognized Appellant by name on sight? 
Did the officer act unreasonably in failing to recognize 
more prudent alternative means of investigation? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), -8(2)(b)(ii) (Supp. 
1989) (effective until July 1, 1990), and Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), -8(2)(e) (Supp. 1989) (effective until July 1, 
1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 24, 1989, Officer Jed Hurst observed Appellant LeRoy 
Raymond Jackson driving his car in a "normal" and appropriate 
manner, westbound on 17th South through the Main Street intersection 
Transcript of Trial Proceedings (July 11, 1989), First Sentencing 
Proceeding (August 14, 1989) and Second Sentencing Proceeding 
(October 2, 1989) (hereinafter collectively referred to as "T") at 
6, 22. Officer Hurst's testimony revealed that "[e]verything seemed 
up to date and normal about [Jackson's] vehicle when [Hurst] first 
saw it driving" (T. 22). Hurst, on duty at the time and driving 
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eastbound or I" r: South, ar^v "suspicious11 ** ' * IIVPII by 
Mr. . T ri r\ - - * - ammitted a 
tratfic violation nor any other statutory crime 
Nevertheless, Hurst made l 
c ( Mot i * Suppress 
proceeding (July *^t«} (hereinafter referred to *>- " M ^ " ) at i <:i, 
Hurst testified that he had tw-n purpos**?" <n ' « -- v*-*h u' le: 
11
 » e suspect's rldIne,l and "to tind out who the car 
belonged * i. 
Officer Hurst impr:rp> 1 y be i i evt/d I. h.il: Jackst m s i a 
I • «in I i,-lie I iii In i'onti:u:Mj,, resembled ; vehicle involved in a 
Postal Shop robbery and described in Mo 989 Deseret News 
newspaper art - *r . -mried a* "Ninth 
' 1111 11 n l ; _ • ime Hurst observed 
Jackson's c^ ^ "wasn't sure- whether .^-»r r 
not" the vehicle ,, nen 
questioned aJDOUt newspaper article -:tn i his recollection :i :he 
car, Hurst recalled that the vehicle was described -*, 
light bott <i ,. -» .ML. ^^. \<^t ing 
ttle preliminary heai.:^ i : ^ otion "3 Suppress, Hurst was 
* o onfused as \ - r - * . , I I nun MINI 
arxvxny - - . ;a i . *
 4 ti,a*. Jackson's car 
was a white ..t L : *. :~*^ :: l::.r.,4n :ontinenta 
Hurst knew nothing more about the 
u„-«__ - .ii * , ;J any police 
reports (MS. * « *. :.-.•..• h.r , '*». _.ie
 Lsuspects] were suppose 
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to look like" (MS, 35). He did not even know if any arrests had 
been made (MS. 22). At the time he observed Jackson's vehicle, 
Hurst was investigating neither the Postal Shop robbery nor any 
other specific crime in the area (MS 22). Hurst relied solely on 
his sketchy recollection of the newspaper article. 
When Jackson pulled into the parking lot, "[Hurst] followed 
the car into the parking lot . . . ." (MS. 17). "[Hurst] stayed up 
by the driveway into the parking lot because as soon as [Jackson's 
car pulled to the east end of the parking lot and] stopped, it went 
into reverse, came back out, did sort of a half circle turn, and 
pulled straight back into another parking stall on the north side of 
the parking lot. (MS. 17, 23); (T. 7-8). Hurst "didn't know 
whether [Jackson's car] was going to leave the parking lot or what 
it was going to do." (MS. 17-18). Hurst waited in the driveway 
"until [Jackson] maneuvered into a different parking stall than he 
had initially pulled into." (MS. 23). 
According to Officer Hurst, after Jackson stopped, Hurst 
"pulled [his patrol] car up behind [Jackson's] car," (MS. 23), 
blocking his access out of the lot (T. 51). "As soon as [Jackson] 
exited [his car, Hurst] stopped [his] car." (T. 9); (MS. 23). 
Jackson "got out and came back, back towards [Hurst's patrol] car. 
At that time [Hurst] got out of [his] car and walked up towards 
[Jackson]." (MS. 18). There was no one else in Jackson's car 
(MS. 18). 
Based on these facts, the trial court ruled, "[a]t the time 
the officer pulled in back of the automobile there was no 
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articulable suspicion of criminal activity on defendant's part." 
(MS. 48). 
Since there was a fence in front of Jackson's car and no 
room to maneuver past the police car, Hurst, who could have parked 
in the empty parking spaces on either side of Jackson's car, had 
intentionally blocked the car (MS. 23-24). Hurst admitted that he 
"had no reason to stop [Jackson]" in the parking lot (T. 27). No 
overhead lights or signals were used (T. 8) The court ruled that 
there was in fact a block: "[t]he police officer [Hurst] upon 
stopping [his patrol car], however, did block [Jackson's] 
automobile, and for me [the court] to find otherwise, frankly, would 
be intellectually dishonest" (T. 51). The court discredited the 
trial testimony of Officer Hurst whose recollection of the blocking 
issue had conveniently improved after he adopted the version of 
another officer who had told him, prior to trial, that Jackson had 
enough room to maneuver past the parked patrol car (T. 52). 
When Hurst encountered Jackson, Hurst "recognized him as 
being Mr. Jackson, but [Hurst] couldn't remember what his first name 
was" (MS. 24). Despite the immediate recognition Hurst continued, 
asking Appellant if "he was Mr. Jackson" (T. 17). Appellant 
correctly responded, "I am Mr. Jackson" (T. 18). 
Intruding further, Hurst asked, "[d]o you have any 
identification?" (T. 18). Jackson responded by giving the officer a 
Checkmart identification card (T. 18); (MS. 24). The card contained 
Appellant's picture and the name, LeRoy Jackson, on it (T. 10, 11, 
18, 19). Hurst testified that Appellant "looked the same as the 
picture on the card" and "knew Appellant was Mr. Jackson" (T. 19). 
Yet Hurst was still not satisfied. Though fully aware of 
Jackson's identity, Hurst asked Jackson for his driver's license 
"[t]o verify who he was and see if he was driving legally or not" 
(T. 20). Hurst reasoned, "I wanted to get some good identification 
from the State," (T. 20), because Jackson "was driving a car," 
(MS. 25), and "Checkmart I.D's are not good I.D." (MS. 25); 
(T. 27). However, Hurst did admit that he had no "reason to believe 
that [Jackson's] Checkmart I.D. was false" (MS. 25). 
At the time Hurst asked Jackson for his driver's license, 
Hurst "knew nothing more about [Jackson] than a suspicion [Hurst] 
had from reading the Sunday [Deseret News] paper" (MS. 26). Hurst 
nonetheless maintained his investigative focus on Jackson. If 
Jackson had attempted to walk away without answering him, Hurst 
"would have demanded a drivers license" (T. 27). 
Instead, Jackson simply admitted that he didn't have his 
license (MS. 26). Unable to "remember if [Jackson] gave [Hurst] a 
reason, or not, as to why [the license] was taken away," (MS. 27), 
Hurst continued his questioning in apparent pursuit of his second 
admitted purpose: "to find out who the car belonged to" (T. 21). 
Hurst did not "ask [Jackson] what he was doing there or where he was 
going" (T. 18). 
Officer Hurst then asked Jackson for his car registration 
(MS. 27). Jackson's explanation, again not "remember[ed] exactly" 
by Hurst, was not incriminating and would not "have changed 
[Hurst's] investigation" or led him to believe that Jackson had 
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stolen the car (MS. 27-28). It appears that Jackson may have 
purchased the car from someone who still had the registration 
(MS. 27). 
The detention was prolonged further as Hurst required 
Jackson to wait for a computer check on the license plate (T. 28). 
However, "[a]t the time [Hurst first] saw the vehicle, there was 
nothing about [the] license plate that would [have given Hurst] a 
clue that it was a stolen plate" (T. 22). Hurst radioed dispatch to 
verify Jackson's registration and driver's license. (MS. 28); 
(T. 12). Dispatch informed Hurst that the license plate on the car 
had been stolen and Jackson's driver's license was suspended 
(T. 12). Hurst considered releasing Jackson with a citation but 
ultimately determined that his lack of "good State identification," 
(MS. 37), required an arrest (T. 13). 
Hurst handcuffed and arrested Jackson for possession of 
stolen property and driving with a suspended driver's license 
(MS. 30); (T. 28). Hurst then frisked Jackson for weapons and 
contraband (T. 29). Nothing was found (T. 30). 
By this time, another officer had arrived on the scene. 
Officer Cracroft conducted an inventory of Jackson's car while 
Officer Hurst, seated beside Jackson in the patrol car, called a 
"wrecker" to impound Appellant's car (T. 13); (MS. 30). The 
officers did not ask Jackson about the contents of the car or 
whether he had left any personal items therein (MS. 34). In 
addition, Hurst could not see what Cracroft did inside of Jackson's 
car during the search (MS. 30-31). 
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The officers did, however, ask Jackson about a pill vial 
Cracroft allegedly found in the car (MS. 31). Officer Hurst opened 
the vial; looked at the contents, "a white powdered substance,"; and 
showed it to Jackson. (MS. 31). Without informing Appellant of his 
Miranda rights, Hurst continued questioning him (MS. 32). 
Mr. Jackson7s statements were suppressed by the trial court because 
of Officer Hurst's unconstitutional inquiry (MS. 50). 
The entire detention lasted half an hour (T. 13, 28). The 
officers took Jackson to the county jail where he was admitted and 
searched by a correctional officer, Billy Ray Romero (T. 32). 
Mr. Romero found two tinfoil packages and a "rolled joint of 
marijuana" on Appellant's person (T. 34). 
The proffered testimony of two of the State's witnesses 
would have indicated that the substances, State's Exhibits 1 and 2, 
were placed in the evidence room and analyzed by the State Crime Lab 
(T. 37). Appellant stipulated to the chain of custody and drug 
analysis (T. 37). The lab technician would have identified the 
tinfoil exhibits as cocaine and the rolled "joint" as "crushed 
marijuana and cocaine residue" (T. 37). 
In a Motion to Suppress before the Honorable Michael R. 
Murphy, Appellant Jackson moved to suppress the cocaine seized from 
his vehicle and the substances found on his person as fruits of an 
illegal stop (Record 33); (MS. 2, 6, 7). Judge Murphy denied 
Appellant's motion to suppress the substances (MS. 51). Appellant 
also argued that the officers conducted an improper inventory search 
though the State consequently stipulated "to the non-admissibility 
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of the evidence regarding this inventory search" (MS. 7). 
In the subsequent bench trial before Judge Murphy, the 
court ruled that "there [was] no articulable suspicion to stop the 
defendant [Jackson] prior to the time that the officer indicated 
that he had placed the defendant under arrest"; the defendant 
voluntarily "exited his car and approached the police car on foot 
before the police car stopped"; the officer "did block the 
automobile"; the officer reasonably expected "an identification 
initially in the form of a drivers license . . . given his problems 
with Checkmart identifications"; "[u]p to that point there had been 
no stop • . . because a reasonable person in the defendant's 
position . . . would have believed he was still free to leave. Upon 
defendant's statement that he had no drivers license, a reasonable 
suspicion arose that [Jackson had committed the crime of] driving 
without a license . . . And therefore, at that time there was a 
basis for a stop . . . and only thereafter did a stop occur." 
(T. 51-53). 
The court found Appellant Jackson guilty of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree 
felony, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
(marijuana), a class B misdemeanor. A third count (receiving stolen 
property [the license plate]) had been previously dismissed. 
(T. 55-56). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Officer Jed Hurst "seized11 Appellant LeRoy Raymond Jackson 
when he parked his patrol car directly behind Mr. Jackson's car. 
The officer had no legal justification for blocking Mr. Jackson's 
car. The officer's appearance and conduct led Mr. Jackson to leave 
his car; Mr. Jackson did not voluntary approach and talk to Officer 
Hurst. Their encounter was not a casual consensual meeting free of 
fourth amendment guarantees. 
Despite his recognition of Appellant by name, Officer Hurst 
unlawfully and repeatedly requested identification from 
Mr. Jackson. This conduct again constituted a seizure unsupported 
by the requisite "reasonable articulable suspicion." 
Mr. Jackson was driving normally down the street just prior 
to his encounter with Officer Hurst. Only after "fishing" for some 
sign of wrongdoing did Officer Hurst discover that Mr. Jackson was 
driving with a suspended license. Officer Hurst, in pursuit of his 
objective to identify Mr. Jackson, should have followed a less 
intimidating course of conduct than blocking, seizing, and 
unnecessarily questioning Mr. Jackson. The subsequent discovery of 
controlled substances on Mr. Jackson's person should have been 




OFFICER HURST "SEIZED" APPELLANT BY BLOCKING HIS CAR. 
In State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court acknowledged "three levels of police encounters with 
the public which . . . are constitutionally permissible." Id. at 
617. 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is 
not detained against his will; 
(2) An officer may seize a person if the officer 
has a "reasonable suspicion" that the person 
has committed or is about to commit a crime; 
however, the "detention must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop"; 
(3) An officer may arrest a suspect if the officer 
has probable cause to believe an offense has 
been committed or is being committed. 
Id. at 617-18 (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 
(5th Cir. 1984)); cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982) (reasonable 
suspicion standard required for questioning). If a police encounter 
does not fall within a "level one" encounter, the individual may 
invoke the fourth amendment which "provides that people have the 
right to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches 
and seizures." State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987); 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Utah Const. Art. I, § 14.. 
In the police encounter, here, between Officer Jed Hurst 
and Appellant LeRoy Raymond Jackson, the initial determination is 
whether a seizure occurred. "A fourth amendment analysis of police 
officer conduct is fact sensitive; thus [appellate courts] review 
the facts in detail." State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah App. 
1989). 
A. OFFICER HURST BLOCKED AND SEIZED APPELLANT'S 
CAR WITHOUT A REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITY. 
"The simple language of the [Fourth] Amendment applies 
equally to seizures of persons and to seizures of property." 
Pavton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). Officer Hurst blocked 
and seized Mr. Jackson's car which, in turn, constituted a seizure 
of Mr. Jackson's person. State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App. 
1989), lends authoritative guidance in this regard. 
In Smith, a case similar to the instant action, this Court 
considered, inter alia, whether defendant Jerome Smith was "seized" 
by an officer who had followed Smith's car into a parking lot, 
waited for him to stop, and then "stopped [the patrol] car behind 
defendant's car, blocking the car." Id. at 880. The officer 
testified that he followed Smith's vehicle because it turned without 
signaling. Id. at 880. 
"The State [in Smith] contended defendant [Smith] 
voluntarily pulled into the parking lot and parked his car and thus 
no fourth amendment stop had occurred." Id. at 880. "The trial 
court, focusing on defendant's initial parking of his car, 
[similarly found] that there was no stop because the defendant 
[Smith] voluntarily pulled into the parking lot." Id. The 
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appellate court disagreed, finding the trial court's "inquiry was 
too narrow" Id. at 881. 
Characterization of the encounter between [the] 
Officer . . . and defendant [Smith] must be 
determined by examining the totality of the 
circumstances . . . We also must consider whether 
defendant "remain[ed], not in the spirit of 
cooperation with the officer's investigation, but 
because he believ[ed] he [was] not free to 
leave . . . ." 
Smith, 781 P.2d at 881 (citations omitted). 
Like the defendant in Smith, Appellant Jackson believed 
that he was not free to leave. If Jackson had initially possessed 
the "spirit of cooperation," the officer's intimidating conduct 
quickly turned his mood into a fear of non-cooperation. 
Officer Hurst had suddenly made a U-turn in the middle of a 
main thoroughfare to follow Jackson, despite the fact that Jackson 
had not committed a traffic violation (T. 7, 27). When Jackson 
pulled into the parking lot, "[Hurst] followed [Jackson's] car into 
the parking lot . . . ." (MS. 17). "[Hurst] stayed up by the 
driveway into the parking lot because as soon as [Jackson's car 
pulled to the east end of the parking lot and] stopped, it went into 
reverse, came back out, did sort of a half circle turn, and pulled 
straight back into another parking stall on the north side of the 
parking lot. (MS. 17, 23); (T. 7-8). Hurst "didn't know whether 
[Jackson's car] was going to leave the parking lot or what it was 
going to do." (MS. 17-18). Hurst waited in the driveway "until 
[Jackson] maneuvered into a different parking stall than he had 
initially pulled into." (MS. 23). 
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If Jackson had not already seen Officer Hurst7s car 
following him, he clearly saw the police car when he parked. 
Jackson went forward to the east, looked behind him to the west 
whereupon he "backed up, sort of a half U-turn11 (T. 8) into the 
other stall on the north side (MS. 18). The front of his car faced 
south. Hurst's police car was clearly visible to Jackson during at 
least one point of the maneuvering. 
Being the driver, (MS. 18), Jackson could see everything in 
front of him. According to Officer Hurst, after Jackson stopped, 
Hurst "pulled [his patrol] car up behind [Jackson's] car," (MS. 23), 
blocking his access out of the lot (T. 51). "As soon as [Jackson] 
exited [his car, Hurst] stopped [his] car." (T. 9); (MS. 23). 
Jackson "got out and came back, back towards [Hurst's patrol] car. 
At that time [Hurst] got out of [his] car and walked up towards 
[Jackson]." (MS. 18). There was no one else in Jackson's car 
(MS. 18). 
The trial court focused entirely on Jackson's decision to 
exit the car rather than the officer's appearance and conduct which 
precipitated it. Although the court did not have the benefit of 
reviewing the recent decision of State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah 
App. 1989), the trial court clearly erred by not following the 
principles of the other submitted decisions. See e.g., People v. 
Guy, 121 Mich. App. 592, 329 N.W.2d 435 (1982), and United States v. 
Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1987). Kerr is especially compelling. 
In Kerr, a deputy observed defendant Duane Kerr loading 
boxes into a vehicle parked in a neighborhood beset with a rash of 
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recent burglaries. Id. at 1385, 1387. The deputy made a U-turn and 
turned into the driveway where Kerr was located. Id. at 1385. Kerr 
"was backing his car out" when he "left his own car and met [the] 
Deputy . . . on foot." Id. As held by the Court: 
Kerr stopped and exited his car primarily in 
response to [the Deputy's] official appearance and 
conduct, rather than of his own volition. Arriving 
in uniform and in a marked partrol car, [the Deputy] 
unquestionably appeared to be acting in an official 
capacity. Instead of waiting in his patrol car at 
the roadside, or parking and walking, [the Deputy] 
pulled into and blocked the one lane driveway as 
Kerr was backing out. [The Deputy's] conduct thus 
precipitated the confrontation with Kerr. . . Under 
the circumstances, [the Deputy's] authority and 
conduct provided Kerr with no reasonable alternative 
except an encounter with the police. Consequently, 
the encounter cannot be deemed voluntary. 
Id. at 1386-87. 
Similarly, instead of waiting in the driveway, or parking 
in one of the available empty parking spaces and walking up to 
Appellant, Officer Hurst, arriving in uniform and driving a marked 
patrol car, blocked Jackson's only access out of the parking lot. 
There were other exits but the close proximity of Hurst's car to 
Jackson's vehicle eliminated Jackson's ability to leave. Moreover, 
as inferred by Kerr, the fact that both defendant Kerr and Appellant 
Jackson left their respective cars does not evidence consent or 
voluntariness. 
The Smith court recognized the likelihood of such police 
initiated stops even when the defendant actually "stops" first: 
Other jurisdictions have held that when an officer 
blocks a defendant's vehicle, a seizure within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment has occurred even 
though the original stop was not initiated by the 
officer. 
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Smith, 781 P.2d at 882 n.3 (emphasis added). The Smith court 
acknowledged applicable case law from other jurisdictions which held 
that a seizure occurs when a defendant's car is blocked by a 
policeman's vehicle. 
In People v. Guv, 121 Mich. App. 592, 329 N.W.2d 435 
(1982), the Michigan Court of Appeals stated: 
Although the initial stop of the 
Continental in the driveway was not the 
result of Officer Hattis' actions, his 
partial blockage of the driveway and 
subsequent visit to the Continental 
clearly constituted a detention of the 
automobile and would be the equivalent of 
a police-initiated "stop." 
Id. at 440. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United 
States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1987), 
scrutinized a similar "blocking" encounter and found 
it was a seizure. The court, in finding a seizure 
had occurred, noted that it was not possible for the 
defendant to drive around the officer's patrol car: 
"[He] stopped and exited his car primarily in 
response to deputy Hendrick's official appearance 
and conduct rather than of his own volition." Id. 
at 1386 See also United States v. Zukas, 843 F.2d 
179, 182 (5th Cir. 1988). 
Smith, 781 P.2d at 882 n.3. The noted authority eviscerates the 
trial court's focus on Appellant Jackson's initial parking of the 
car and on the finding that there was no stop. 
At the time the officer pulled in back of [Jackson's 
car] there was no articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity on defendant's part. There was, however, 
at that time no stop. The officer was free to pull 
up where he wished in the parking lot. It is true 
that the defendant could not pull the car away. 
However, the defendant was free to walk 
wherever he wanted. [Instead] of walking on either 
side of the car . . . to the bar, he chose [instead, 
voluntarily] to approach the officer. The officer 
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then engaged him in conversation, asking for 
identification. Still no stop. 
(MS. 48-49). The court's reasoning is troublesome. 
Despite citing the totality of the circumstances" standard, 
the court quickly dismissed the precipitating conduct of Officer 
Hurst: "a reasonable person in Mr. Jackson's position should have 
believed that he was free to leave notwithstanding the fact that the 
vehicle was blocked" (T. 53). The court clearly erred in its 
decision thus mandating reversal. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1987). 
The very fact that Appellant's vehicle was blocked 
unquestionably restrained Jackson's freedom to leave the area. 
While it may be true that Officer Hurst was free to pull up wherever 
he wished, the fact that his chosen parking spot blocked Jackson's 
access out of the parking lot turned the entire encounter into a 
seizure. A fence blocked one side of Jackson's car and Officer 
Hurst's car blocked the other (MS. 23). The initial seizure of the 
car is not negated by Jackson's "freedom" to walk wherever he 
wanted. More specifically, 
Blocking a citizen's path or impeding his progress 
is an indicator that a seizure has occurred. 
Similarly, retaining his ticket or identification 
may indicate a seizure if his freedom is thereby 
restrained. An officer's statement that the 
individual is the focus of an investigation or that 
a truly innocent person would cooperate with police 
tends to indicate lack of consent and therefore a 
seizure. 
United States v. Pualisi, 723 F.2d 779, 783 (11th Cir. 1984). A 
driver would have no other choice but to approach the officer and 
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ask, defensively, "Did I do something wrong?"; "Why did you follow 
me?"; or "Why is my car being blocked?" 
Officer Hurst testified that his admitted purpose in 
following Jackson was "to find out who [the suspect] was," (T. 21), 
believing improperly that Jackson's car was connected to the 
reported robbery (T. 2 0-21). There were no other people in 
Jackson's car, (MS. 18), and Officer Hurst was not investigating any 
other matters at the time (MS. 22). If Jackson had attempted to 
walk away without answering any questions, Hurst "would have 
demanded a drivers license" (T. 27). 
Jackson was undoubtedly the focus of Hurst's investigation. 
Jackson's desire to drive depended entirely on the withdrawal of the 
police car. In addition, Hurst initiated the conversation by asking 
for identification (MS. 24). Hurst asked all the questions, placing 
Jackson in a defensive posture. Consequently, Jackson's decision to 
approach the officer cannot be considered voluntary. 
As indicated earlier by the authority in Smith,1 "when an 
officer blocks a defendant's vehicle, a seizure . . . has occurred 
even though the original stop was not initiated by the officer." 
Smith, 781 P.2d at 882 n.3. Even if Jackson did stop his car and 
1
 The Smith court ultimately found that the stop was 
constitutional even though the police seized Smith's car by parking 
behind him because it was incident to a lawful citation for a 
traffic violation. Smith, 781 P.2d at 85. By comparison, Officer 
Hurst's unconstitutional conduct was even more egregious than the 
officer in Smith, since Hurst conceded that he had no basis for the 
stop and Jackson was free to leave. At least the officer in Smith 
observed a traffic violation before he blocked defendant Smith's car. 
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approached the officer first, his actions were a direct consequence 
of the blockage. In reality the encounter was a police-initiated 
stop. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) ("In 
view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable 
person would have believed that he was not free to leave"). The 
illegal seizure renders inadmissible the subsequent discovery of 
controlled substances found on Appellant Jackson's person. Cf. 
State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985); Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471. 
B. OFFICER HURST'S APPEARANCE AND CONDUCT 
CONSTITUTED A SHOW OF AUTHORITY 
"A seizure . . . occurs only when the officer by means of 
physical force or show of authority has in some way restricted the 
liberty of a person." State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 
1987). Officer Hurst could not have chosen a better way of showing 
his authority than by parking directly behind Jackson's car when 
there were empty parking spaces on either side of the car. The 
car's pathway was blocked, Jackson's exit was impeded, and his 
freedom was restrained. 
A case factually similar to the case at bar, State v. 
Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), illustrates that before officers 
can exhibit even the slightest bit of authority, they must first 
have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In Swanigan, 
Officer Young, in response to a reported burglary, noticed two 
individuals walking along the road in the vicinity of the 
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burglarized home. Id. at 719. Young called dispatch, requested an 
"attempt to locate" broadcast of the two individuals, and continued 
towards the home. Id. Approximately two hours later, Officer 
Bithell observed defendant Swanigan and a companion walking "some 
three blocks" away from the home. "Bithell ordered the two to stop 
and then asked for identification. Id. The officers subsequently 
learned, through a warrants check on the two individuals, that one 
party had an outstanding warrant. Both men were arrested. Id. 
During the accompanying pat-down, the officer recovered some of the 
property stolen from the burglarized home. Id. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held, "the stop was based 
on a mere hunch rather than the constitutionally mandated 
'reasonable suspicion'; consequently, the confiscated evidence was 
erroneously admitted at trial." Swanigan. 699 P.2d at 719. The 
facts of Swanigan are essentially identical to the facts in the 
present case. 
Officer Bithell stopped defendant Swanigan and requested 
identification on a mere hunch. Similarly, Officer Hurst blocked 
Appellant Jackson's car and requested identification without having 
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The authority 
exhibited by Officer Bithell in ordering defendant Swanigan to stop 
is functionally equivalent to the authority exhibited by Officer 
Hurst in blocking Appellant Jackson's car. £f. State v. Truiillo, 
739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987). 
The officers conduct in both cases was a clear show of 
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authority.2 Both officers appeared in uniform and marked patrol 
cars. Both officers acted prematurely, relying on second hand 
authority rather than directly observing criminal activity. Both 
officers, knowing that they have no legitimate grounds to pursue 
their investigation further, detained the "suspects" by asking for 
identification. See infra Point II, page 3-\ . "Fishing" for a sign 
of wrongdoing, both officers "caught" the suspects for their past 
misdeeds, albeit unconnected to the investigation. Now armed with 
"reasonable suspicion" both officers frisked and ultimately found 
suppressible evidence. 
As the Swanigan Court held unlawful the conduct of Officer 
Bithell, Appellant Jackson respectfully requests that this Court 
hold unlawful the improper conduct of Officer Hurst. 
POINT II 
OFFICER HURST "SEIZED" APPELLANT BY REQUIRING 
IDENTIFICATION. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Officer Hurst did not seize 
Jackson by blocking his car, Hurst, who had no reasonable suspicion 
to continue his investigation, subsequently seized Jackson7s person 
2
 Two additional factors are important: time and 
location. Lacking further justification for his unlawful conduct, 
Officer Hurst, unlike Officer Bithell, had neither the immediacy of 
the situation, nor the geographic closeness of the situation in his 
favor. Officer Bithell acted on 'a recent two hour police bulletin; 
Officer Hurst acted on an outdated four day old newspaper article 
(T. 6-7). Officer Bithell stopped the suspects three blocks away 
from the scene of a just reported crime; Officer Hurst stopped a 
suspect near 17th South and Main, no where near the Ninth South and 
150 East location of the Postal Shop robbery (T. 6-7). 
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by asking for identification. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982). 
"A person may not be detained and required to identify himself." 
Commonwealth v. Holloway, 384 S.E.2d 99, 102 (Va. App. 1989). 
Although Appellant recognizes that not all police questioning of 
citizens implicates the fourth amendment, Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 
491, 497-98 (1983), "when [officers detain a suspect] for the 
purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they [perform] a 
seizure of his person subject to the requirements of the fourth 
amendment." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979). 
In Brown, two officers observed Zachary Brown in an alley 
walking away from another man in a "high drug problem area." Brown, 
443 U.S. at 48. The "officers did not claim to suspect [Brown] of 
any specific misconduct . . . but still "asked [him] to identify 
himself and explain what he was doing there." Id. According to the 
officers, "the situation looked suspicious and we had never seen 
[Brown] in that area before.7" Id. Brown, after refusing to 
identify himself, was arrested for refusing to give his name and 
address to an officer in violation of a Texas statute. Id. 
(citation omitted). 
The Texas courts convicted Brown but the United States 
Supreme Court reversed, holding "appellant may not be punished for 
refusing to identify himself." Brown, 443 U.S. at 53. "[T]he Texas 
statute [was] . . . designed to advance a weighty social 
objective . . . : prevention of crime." The Supreme Court reasoned, 
But even assuming that purpose is served to some 
degree by stopping and demanding identification from 
an individual without any specific basis for 
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believing he is involved in criminal activity, the 
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it. 
When such a stop is not based on objective criteria, 
the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices 
exceeds tolerable limits. 
Brown, 443 U.S. at 53. 
Like the officer in Brown, id. at 52, Officer Hurst 
acknowledged that the reason for stopping Jackson was to ascertain 
his identity (T. 21). But, unlike the officers in Brown, Officer 
Hurst had ascertained Jackson's identity at the outset of the 
"encounter." Once both parties exited their vehicles, Hurst saw 
Jackson and "recognized him as being Mr. Jackson, but . . . couldn't 
remember what his first name was" (MS. 24); (T. 17). Hurst 
nonetheless asked Appellant if he was Mr. Jackson (T. 17). 
Appellant responded, "I am Mr. Jackson" (T. 18). Hurst thus 
ascertained Jackson's name on sight and then received oral 
confirmation (T. 18). His purpose, "to know any possible suspect's 
name," (T. 21) was now satisfied. The protections of Brown apply 
with even greater force to Officer Hurst, who already knew Jackson's 
identity. Hurst should have moved on. 
Instead, Hurst, who had just confirmed Appellant's 
identity, intruded further by asking, "Do you have any 
identification?" (T. 18). Jackson responded by giving the officer a 
Checkmart identification card (T. 18); (MS. 24). The card contained 
Appellant's picture and the name, LeRoy Jackson, on it (T. 10, 11, 
18, 19). Hurst acknowledged that Appellant "looked the same as the 
picture on the card" and "knew Appellant was Mr. Jackson" (T. 19). 
Again, Hurst's purpose was fulfilled. 
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Yet, Hurst was still not satisfied. He then asked Jackson 
for his driver's license (MS. 24, 25); (T. 20). Hurst testified 
that he wanted "some good identification from the State" (T. 20), 
because Jackson "was driving a car" and "Checkmart identifications 
are often false" (MS. 25). The trial court held that the officers 
conduct was reasonable: 
It was reasonable that the police officer would 
expect an identification initially in the form of a 
driver's license, and therefore, it was reasonable 
for him to ask for a driver's license, given his 
problems with Checkmart identifications. 
(T. 52). The trial court erred in this determination. 
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989) would 
prohibit such intrusions, at least by analogy, when the officer's 
conduct exceeds the legitimate scope of his objectives. In 
Schlosser, an officer pulled a car over for speeding. Id. at 1133. 
Suspicious of the passenger's movements in the car and their 
apparent attempts to hide something, the officer opened the 
passenger door of the stopped vehicle. Id. at 1134. Although the 
initial stop may have been lawful, Justice Stewart, after citing a 
recent United States Supreme Court decision, recognized "that even a 
small intrusion beyond the legitimate scope of an initially lawful 
search is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1135 (citing 
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). "The officer's 'clear 
initial objective' in opening the car door was to see whether [the 
defendant] was 'hiding something' However, without probable cause 
to justify it, that act clearly exceeded the lawful scope of a 
legitimate governmental interest." Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135-36. 
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By analogy, Officer Hurst's "clear initial objective" in 
following, blocking and questioning Appellant Jackson was "[t]o find 
out who he was." (T. 21). Assuming, arguendo, that the initial 
block was not unlawful and the resulting encounter was in fact 
consensual, Officer Hurst, with neither probable cause nor 
reasonable suspicion to justify his requests for "any 
identification," clearly exceeded the lawful scope of his 
investigation when he had already recognized Appellant by name on 
sight. Cf. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988) 
(citations omitted) ("Anything less [than a reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause] would invite intrusions upon constitutionally 
guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than 
inarticulate hunches, a result [the United States Supreme Court] has 
consistently refused to sanction"). 
If Officer Hurst's conduct in asking Appellant, "if he was 
Mr. Jackson?" was proper, (T. 17), once Appellant replied, "I am 
Mr. Jackson," (T. 18), Officer Hurst should have stopped his 
questioning. A "small intrusion" occurred when Hurst asked 
generally for "any identification." (T. 18); (MS. 24). A 
substantial intrusion then occurred when Hurst asked for the 
driver's license (MS. 25); (T. 19). 
Officer Hurst specifically admitted that, at the time he 
requested Jackson's driver's license, Hurst had no reason "to 
believe that Jackson's Checkmart I.D. was false" (MS. 25). Even if 
Hurst had experienced problems with Checkmart identification cards, 
that fact would not apply here because Hurst recognized Jackson on 
sight; Jackson correctly stated his name, thereby confirming Hurst's 
initial recognition; and Hurst knew the Checkmart identification 
card also corroborated Jackson's identity (MS, 24); (T. 17-19). 
Hurst's testimony that he asked for Jackson's driver's license 
because "[h]e was driving a car" (MS. 25) is completely improper. 
Jackson had not committed a traffic violation. Cf. Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Hurst even admitted that "he had no 
reason to stop [Jackson]" (T. 27). 
The court's reasoning is also flawed: "upon defendant's 
statement that he had no driver's license, a reasonable suspicion 
arose that a crime or infraction had been committed, that is, 
driving without a license, and the defendant had committed that 
crime or infraction" (T. 52). The trial court clearly erred because 
the officer's reasonable suspicion arose only in hindsight and not 
at the time when the defendant was driving in a "normal" and 
appropriate manner down the street. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (except in those situations in which there is 
at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is 
unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either 
the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for 
violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in 
order to check his driver's license and the registration of the 
automobile are unreasonable under the fourth amendment"). 
Hurst's second admitted purpose in following Mr. Jackson 
was "to find out who the car belonged to" (T. 21), but Hurst, again, 
could not articulate a reasonable basis for such an inquiry. As 
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noted above, the request for Jackson's driver's license and 
registration was improper. 
Officer Hurst's subsequent finding that Jackson was driving 
with a suspended license resulted from an unfounded suspicion. All 
the substances found on Mr. Jackson were the result of an illegal 
seizure. The trial court clearly erred in denying Appellant's 
Motion to Suppress the substances. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1987). 
POINT III 
THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE NEED FOR AN INVESTIGATION. 
Not only did Officer Hurst illegally seize Appellant 
Jackson's car and unlawfully request his identification, Hurst also 
unreasonably detained Jackson to investigate an already completed 
crime. 
The factors . . . may be somewhat different when the 
stop to investigate past criminal activity is 
involved rather than the stop to investigate ongoing 
criminal conduct. This is because the governmental 
interests and the nature of the intrusions involved 
in the two situations may differ. As we noted in 
Terry, the general interests present in the context 
of ongoing or imminent criminal activity is "that of 
effective crime prevention and detention.11 A stop 
to investigate an already completed crime does not 
necessarily promote the interest of crime prevention 
as directly as a stop to investigate suspected 
ongoing criminal activity. Similarly, the exigent 
circumstances which require a police officer to step 
in before a crime is committed or completed are not 
necessarily as pressing long afterwards. Public 
safety may be less threatened by a suspect in a past 
crime who now appears to be going about his lawful 
business than it is by a suspect who is currently in 
the process of violating the law. Finally, officers 
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making the stop to investigate past crimes may have 
a wider range of opportunities to choose the time 
and circumstances of the stop. 
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1985) (citations 
omitted). 
The Hensley court then qualified their statements. 
Officers may detain a suspect "if police have a reasonable 
suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person 
they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a 
completed felony. Id. at 229. Clearly, such a detention would not 
apply here when the trial court expressly held, H[a]t the time the 
officer [Hurst] pulled in back of the automobile there was no 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity on defendant's [Jackson] 
part" (MS. 48); (T. 51). Officer Hurst should have acquired more 
information before he acted. 
In addition, as noted by the court in Anderson v. State, 
387 A.2d 281 (Md. App. 1978), in its discussion of the reasonable 
suspicion standard: 
The rationale underlying Terry is hardly so potent 
where, as here the crime is six days old and there 
is no perceptible reason why further surveillance 
and investigation could not be undertaken, rather 
than immediately precipitating a street encounter 
with its concomitant danger to the officers and 
intrusion upon the personal security of citizens. 
Id. at 284. Obviously, if police action cannot be justified under 
the higher standard of Terry, Officer Hurst's unfounded suspicions 
cannot justify an unreasonable confrontation of a crime at least 
four days old, assuming the newspaper reported the robbery a day 
after it occurred. 
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Nothing in Appellant Jackson's circumstances required 
Officer Hurst's immediate attention. The lack of immediacy is one 
of many factors distinguishing the present case from the somewhat 
related cases of State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987); Layton 
Citv v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1987) cert, denied 765 P.2d 
1277 (1987); and Bountiful Citv v. Maestas, No. 890054-CA (Utah App. 
March 8, 1990). 
In Deitman. police officers had just responded to a burglar 
alarm. "[A]rriving at the scene," the officers observed a truck 
pull away from the curb across the street from the shop. Id. at 
617. The officers followed the truck until it stopped on the other 
side of the street. Then, an "officer called to defendants and 
asked if he could speak to them." Id. 
In contrast, Officer Hurst observed Jackson's car more than 
four days after the robbery had actually occurred. Moreover, the 
officers in Deitman followed but did not block the defendant's 
truck. Officer Hurst blocked Appellant's car. The officers in 
Deitman first asked if he could speak to the suspects. No such 
request was made by Officer Hurst. The officers in Deitman did not 
recognize or know the suspected individuals. Officer Hurst 
recognize Appellant on sight. The facts of Deitman constituted a 
level one encounter. Appellant Jackson was involved in a level two 
confrontation. 
In Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1987), 
an officer followed and parked behind defendant James Bennett's 
truck. There is no indication that the officer blocked the truck. 
- 29 -
Bennett walked up to the police car and "freely initiated a 
conversation." Id. at 966. Appellant Jackson, having just been 
blocked by Officer Hurst, did not initiate a conversation, nor does 
the record reflect that Jackson asked even one question during the 
encounter. 
The officer in Layton City "detected a strong odor of 
alcohol" coming from Bennett, id. at 967, whereas in the case at 
bar, Officer Hurst detected nothing incriminating from the conduct, 
comments, or appearance of Appellant Jackson. The officer in Lavton 
City also had an arguably immediate need to detain the intoxicated 
Bennett. Appellant Jackson never was or appeared intoxicated. He 
posed no threat to the public and Officer Hurst improperly detained 
Jackson after his identity was corroborated by the identification 
card. 
In Bountiful City v. Maestas, No. 890054-CA (Utah App. 
March 8, 1990), an officer was issuing a traffic ticket when two 
citizens informed him about an apparently intoxicated person in a 
vehicle near a State Liquor Store. After completing the traffic 
stop, the officer spotted the vehicle described by the citizens in 
the liquor store parking lot. The officer pulled alongside 
defendant Luis Maestas' car, made initial contact, and received 
Maestas' driver's license. 
The level one encounter of Maestas is not controlling 
here. The officer in Maestas knew what the vehicle looked like, 
unlike Officer Hurst, who "wasn't sure . . . [if] it matched or 
not." (MS. 17). The officer in Maestas responded promptly, driving 
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to the nearby liquor store where the suspect was reportedly 
situated. Officer Hurst's response was untimely. The officer in 
Maestas properly pursued one individual. Officer Hurst followed one 
suspect in a car which may or may not have been the same vehicle 
which reportedly contained four individuals. The officer in Maestas 
"pulled alongside" defendant Maestas' car; Officer Hurst blocked 
Appellant Jackson's car. 
The officer in Maestas may have been legitimately concerned 
about a preventable, imminent hazard, an allegedly intoxicated party 
"sitting in the driver's seat with the motor running." Jackson, by 
comparison, was not driving and presented no articulable hazard. 
Maestas identified himself. Officer Hurst already knew Jackson's 
identity. 
In sum, Officer Hurst acted unreasonably in failing to 
recognize the more prudent alternatives. First, he should not have 
blocked Appellant's car. There were other empty spaces in the 
parking lot. Second, he should not have repeatedly asked for 
identification when he already knew Jackson's identity. Third, in 
contrast to the implications argued by the State (T. 45), Officer 
Hurst was not restricted in what he could do once Jackson parked his 
car. Hurst still could have radioed dispatch for the license plate 
check without questioning Jackson. It is clear that Hurst had no 
grounds for detaining Jackson and his subsequent discovery of the 
suspended driver's license was fortuitous. All of Officer Hurst's 
subsequent actions were tainted by the illegal seizure of Jackson's 
car and the detention of Jackson's person. The controlled 
- 31 -
substances found on Jackson's person must be suppressed. Cf. 
People v. Bello. 45 Cal. App. 3rd 970, 119 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1975) 
(subsequent action of an officer in shining his light in a 
defendant's car, revealing the butt of a gun was improper, for "once 
the officer had seen and talked to defendant and realized he was not 
intoxicated as the officer initially believed, the officer had no 
legitimate reason for detaining him further or for pursuing any 
further investigation of him"); State v. Chatton, 468 N.E.2d 1237 
(Ohio 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
convictions and remand this case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this ^Z> day of March, 1990. 
KAREN STAM 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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